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RECENT DECISIONS

SECURITlES LEGISLATION REGISTRATION STATEMENT -

II03

CIVIL LIABILITIES ON ACCOUNT OF F AI.SE
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS LICENSES -

Plaintiff, purchaser of stock in Condor Pictures, Inc., brought an action against
the officers of the corporation and the auditors who certified the registration
statement, to recover damages under section II of the Securities Act of 1933.1
The action was founded upon misrepresentations and omissions in the registration statement, concerning a lease made by Condor Pictures, Inc., which the
auditors failed to set up as a contingent liability. The defendants at the time
of the suit stipulated that the stock had no market value, but the plaintiff did
not offer any evidence of the actual value of the stock beyond a showing that
the corporation was adjudicated insolvent for purposes of reorganization under
the Bankruptcy Act at the time suit was instituted, and that an auditor's summary of the books showed that the corporation had been losing money during a
certain period of time. The issuer's .final amended statement was registered in
February, 1937, the plaintiff alleging discovery in May, 1938, but failing
to prove on trial why the discovery was not made sooner.2 Held, in no event

1 48 Stat. L. 82, § I 1, 15 U. S. C. (1934), § 77k: "In case any part of the
registration statement ••• con4ined an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted
to state a material fact required to be stated therein • • • any person acquiring such
security ••• may ••• sue "(2) Every person who was a director of ••• or partner in the issuer at the
time of the filing of the • • • registration statement. • • •
"(4) every accountant ••• who has ••• certified any part of the registration
statement. • • ."
248 Stat. L. 84, § 13, as amended by 48 Stat. L. 908, 15 U. S. C. (1934), §
77m: "No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section II
••• unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the
omission, or after such discovery should have been made in the exercise of reasonable
diligence. • • • In no event shall any such action be brought • • • more than three years
after the security was bona .fide offered to the public••••"
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may the auditors be held, for at the time of their certification of the books the
lease had not yet been executed and consequently could not have been discovered
by them and thus in the certified audit there was no omission to state a material
fact required to be stated therein; the officers of the corporation are not liable
because: (I) no damages were shown, as the plaintiffs failed to show the actual
value of the stock at the time of suit, ( 2) even if damages had been proved the
action would have been barred by the limitations of section 13 of the act.3
Shonts 'JJ. Hirliman, (D. C. Cal. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 478.
Despite the scope of the civil liability provisions of the Securities Act,4'
there has been remarkably little litigation, and those few cases which have
reached the courts indicate that recovery is difficult.5 In the :first place there are
stringent limitations. In no event may an action be maintained after three years
from the time the security was first offered to the public; or unless brought
within a year after the discovery of the fraud; or unless brought after -the fraud
should have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence. 6 To recover,
the purchaser must obviously be a diligent one, and in the Shonts case there is an
additional requirement of alacrity. One of the grounds for denying recovery
was that the plaintiff in the exercise of diligence could have discovered the
fraud in less than a year, because, as a stockholder he was in a position to
inquire into, and detect fraud in, corporate matters, as he had the right to inspect the corporate books and records. Undoubtedly a search of the records
would have revealed the misstatement, but in view of the practical difficulties
that face the owner of a small interest of stock in attempting such an inquiry
the reasoning of the court ignores the realities of the situation. The construction
of section I 3 making discovery a part of the cause of action,7 and interpreting
as "reasonable 4iligence" the duty to inspect corporate records in order to dis3 lbid. As indicated in Rosenberg v. Hano, (D. C. Pa. 1938) 26 F. Supp. 160,
this section is more than a statute of limitation. It imposes a condition upon the right
of action and compliance with the condition must be averred.
4 Civil remedies are provided in sections l I and l 2 of the act. Section l l gives the
right of action to the purchaser of the security, for false statements or omissions in
the registration statement, against all the persons who signed the statement; against
every director, partner, or person who performed such functions in the issuer at the
time of the registration statement; every- accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any
person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him who consents to
have his name used in connection with the statement.
Section l z creates a right of action in favor of the immediate purchaser against
the person who sells him the security on the basis of a false and misleading prospectus,
or one not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission in conformity with
the act as provided in section 5. The seller may defend the action if he, in the exercise
of reasonable care, did not know and could not have lmown of such untruth or omission.
15 Martin v. Hull, (App. D. C. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 208, cert. denied, 302 U.S.
726, 58 S. Ct. 47 (1937); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., (D. C. Pa. 1939)
z7 F. Supp. 763; Rosenberg v. Hano, (D. C. Pa. 1938) 26 F. Supp. 160; Farrell v.
Reynolds, (S. Ct. 1939) II N. Y. S. (2d) u7, affd. (App. Div. 1939) 16 N. Y. S.
(2d) 530; Thom v. Austin Silver Mining Co., 171 Misc. 400, IZ N. Y. S. (2d)
675 (1939).
6 Section l 3, quoted supra note 2.
7 See note 3, supra.
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cover possible frauds fa hardly consistent with any acceptable definition of that
phrase. Also barring the plaintiff's recovery was a failure to show damages.8
Since it was agreed that the stock had no market value, the plaintiff further
attempted to show his loss by proof that the corporation was adjudged insolvent
for purposes of reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act.9 In addition he presented an auditor's summary of the books but failed to show the actual intrinsic
value of the stock by proof that the corporate liabilities exceeded the assets.
Unhappily enough, in a case like this where the assets are at best conjectural,
being dependent upon future bookings, leases of uncertain cost, and numerous
contracts, proof that the corporation is insolvent in either the equity or the
bankruptcy sense entails considerable expense and is a factor that will undoubtedly
discourage the holder of a small block of stock from availing himself of the
civil remedies the act affords.10 Under the decision of this case the necessity
of proof of actual loss is a factor to be contended with and the poverty of the
aggrieved party is not a basis for dispensing with this fundamental requirement.
While the policy of the act is unquestionably to protect the investing public,
it cannot be construed as an "insurer" of bad investments. Before a plaintiff is
entitled to recover he must show the amount of his damage, Undoubtedly the
word "value" as used in section I I is susceptible to more than one interpretation.11 Was it intended to be read "actual value" or "market value"? Due to
the fact that in the present case the stock had no market value, the decision
unfortunately fails to dispel the enigma.12 There is, however, no intimation in
the decision that if the stock had a market value the necessity of proving actual
value would be dispensed with. Despite the apparent easy recovery under the
8 The measure of damages under section II is {a) the difference between the
purchase price and the value of the security at the time suit is brought, (b) the difference between the amount paid and the price at which the security was disposed of in
the market before suit, or {c) the difference between purchase price and price at which
the security was disposed of in the market after the suit but before judgment. In no
event may the damages exceed the total undenvritten offering price of the security
and there may be a deduction from the recovery of any depreciation caused by factors
other than the material misstatement or omission.
The measure of damages under section I z is the consideration paid for the
security, less the amount of income received thereon, or, if the security has been
disposed of before suit the difference between the price paid and the price sold.
0 48 Stat. L. 9Iz, § 77B (1934), superseded by Chapter X of the Chandler
Act, 5z Stat. L. 887, §§ I4I-I44, II U.S. C. (Supp. I938),.§§ 541-544-io See note 4, supra.
11 See note 8, supra.
12 The general rule at common law was that if there is a market value it governs
the amount of damages. Indeed, in many cases it has been held that proof of actual
value may not be shown if there is a market value. The market price of the stock
at the time of purchase is streng evidence of its value, Warner v. Benjamin, 89 Wis.
290, 6z N. W. 179 (1895), although not conclusive.
Other courts hold, more consistently with the principal case, that the basis of
estimating d:unages is the difference between the real value and the amount the defrauded party was induced to pay. Smith v. Bolles, I3z U. S. 125, IO S. Ct. 39 (I889);
Sigafus v. Porter, 179 U.S. n6, ZI S. Ct. 34 (1900). See 4 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES,
4th ed., § II7I (1916).

II06

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

provisions of section 11 of the act, this case indicates the necessity of showing
the actual value of the stock at the time of suit, and the seemingly unreasonable
necessity. of bringing the action within a short time of the filing of the false
registration statement. The result of the case may seem harsh, but it is necessary
to keep in mind that the plaintiff has been given an unusual remedy and one
which has removed many of the common-law obstacles to recovery under similar circumstances.13 Other than on the issue of limitations, the decision seems
acceptable inasmuch as it is not unreasonable to require that the aggrieved party
show his actual loss before being entitled to recovery. Especially is this true
where the plaintiff has chosen the damage remedy in preference to the simpler
alternative of recission and restitution under section 12 of the act.14

18 Principally the act departs from the common-law mores of liability in the
following respects: (1) a purchaser, no matter how remote he may be from the vendor,
may sue the parties liable; (2) the purchaser need not show reliance on the misstatement; (3) the purchaser need not establish a causal relation between the loss and the
untruth or omission; (4) requirement of scienter is automatically provided by the
investigation the issuer is required to make before registering the statement, and the
burden of proving a lack of scienter is on the defendant under section 77k (b);
(S) there is no necessity for the purchaser to rescind, or to return the stock, either
before or after suit.
14 " • • • who may sue either at law or in equity ••• to recover the consideration
£aid for such security • • .upon the tender of such security. • • ." 48 Stat. L. 84
(1933), 15 U.S. C. (1934), § 771 (2).

